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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1952
the commission of the crime on trial. Also, evidence of flight, resistance
to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name and criminal conduct
during flight for the purpose of financing further flight is admissible for
the jury's consideration in determining whether there was a guilty connec-
tion with the crime charged.
In State v. Spno25 the trial court had read to the jury the entire statute
defimng the crime in question including the penal clause. Following this,
the court told the jury that they had nothing to do with the consequences to
the defendant in case he were found guilty. The court of appeals held that
a charge conforming to the requirements of Ohio General Code Section
13442-9 cured the error, if any, of the trial court in reading the penalty
clause to the jury; and that such error, if any, was not prejudicial to the
defendant.
Two courts of appeals' decisions dealt with the matter of supplemental
charges to the jury after they had retired for deliberation. In State v. Whte-
head28 the trial court had answered with supplemental charges questions
submitted by the jury foreman after the jury had been deliberating for some
time. In State v. Dean2' the trial court, in addition to admomshing the jury
of the importance of their reaching a verdict after having deliberated for
several hours, reread a portion of its general charge to the jury when the jury
returned for further instructions. Both appellate decisions approved the
conduct of the trial courts which had been predicated on Ohio General Code
Section 11420-6 authorizing the giving of additional instructions when
requested by the jury.28
MAURICE S. CULP
DAMAGES
In Alexander Hamilton Institte v. Jubel$ a correspondence school
sought recovery for the entire contract price of a course. The defendant had
agreed to pay for the entire course in monthly payments but after part-pay-
ment refused to pay any more and returned the materials he had received.
The court stated the rule as follows: "A party to an executory contract, on
refusing to proceed therewith, is liable only for damages resulting from the
90 Ohio App. 139, 104 N.E.2d 200 (1951).
'91 Ohio App. 156, 107 N.E.2d 892 (1951).
790 Ohio App. 398, 106 N.E.2d 303 (1951).
:'A somewhat sunilar problem was considered in State v. Griffin, 106 N.E.2d 668
(Ohio App. 1952) wherein it was determined that it was not prejudicial error for
the court to send a copy of its charge to the jury room under Ohio General Code
Section 13442-8.
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breach and not for the contract price. The burden is on the plaintiff to
establish the extent of damage. 2 This burden which the plaintiff has, in-
dudes, in effect, the necessity of proving the economy of not having to per-
form the remaining portion of the contract. This decision is in accord with
the opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Allen, Heaton & McDonad,
Inc. v. Castle Farm Amusement Co.3
Sadler v. Bromberg4 involved a recovery for defective installation of tile
during construction of a house. The proper measure of damages was "the
reasonable cost of material and labor required to restore this job so as to
place it in the condition contemplated by the parties when they signed the
contract, that is, such an amount as would be the reasonable cost of restor-
ing the job" and not the difference in the market value of the property im-
mediately before and after the injury.
In Midvale Coal Co. v. Cardox Corp.6 the defendant breached a contract
to service certain equipment of the plaintiff; the equipment became defec-
tive; and, as a result thereof, an employee was injured. The Industrial Com-
mission of Ohio paid for such injuries and under the merit system raised the
the amount which the plaintiff was required to pay into the state fund. The
plaintiff sued in breach of contract. In an earlier opinion in the same liti-
gation,7 the overruling of the defendant's demurrer was sustained. This
appeal is from an award equal to the increased amount which the plaintiff
was required to pay to the state fund. That increased amount was greater
than the compensation paid the injured employee. Basing the decision
squarely on Hadley v. Baxendale,8 the court held that the plaintiff's liability
under the Workmen's Compensation Act was within the contemplation of
the parties when they entered the contract but only to the amount of the
employee's compensation for the immediate injury. "It is certainly not
natural and according to the usual course of things to have payments by an
insurer on a single insurance daim increase the insurance premiums of the
insured by substantially more than the amount of such payments." The
excess in the amount payable to the fund occurred because the Industrial
Commission in making its computations under the merit system considered
'89 Ohio App. 480, 102 N.E.2d 741 (1951)
'Id. at 482, 102 N.E.2d at 743.
' 151 Ohio St. 522, 86 N.E.2d 782 (1949)
'62 Ohio L. Abs. 73, 106 N.E.2d 306 (Ohio App. 1950).
'Id. at 75, 106 N.E.2d at 307
'157 Ohio St. 526, 106 N.E.2d 556 (1952).
'Midvale Coal Co. v. Cardox Corp., 152 Ohio St. 437, 89 N.E.2d 673 (1949)
' 1 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
'Midvale Coal Co. v. Cardox Corp., 157 Ohio St. 526, 533, 106 N.E.2d 556, 560
(1952)
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additional factors than the cost of the immediate injury. Judge Taft, in a
concurring opinion, pointed out that no consideration was given to the
amount of recovery that would be allowed in the event that the additional
premiums were less than the amount paid on account of the injuries of the
employee.
In Dams v. Zuckert° a young woman sought recovery for injuries sus-
tamined as a result of being struck by an automobile. The court of appeals
held that in calculating damages it was proper for the jury to take into con-
sideraton the fact that the plaintiff was required to postpone her contem-
plated marriage. The court felt that this was a manifestation of the general
doctrine that: "Where a woman, who, prior to an injury, was eligible to
marry and is so injured as a proximate result of such claimed negligence,
so as to minimize or destroy her prospects of marriage . the jury should
be instructed to consider such circumstances, in determining the plaintiffs
damage.''
Smsthhisler v. Dutter'2 was a suit by a husband for alienation of the
affections of his wife. The question involved was: What is the legal re-
quirement as to malice for the allowance of punitive damages? The usual
standard for allowing punitive damages in Ohio is proof of fraud, express
malice or insult. The supreme court in approving the instruction given
by the trial judge said: "Where a person wrongfully, unlawfully and in-
tentionally alienates the affections of a spouse for the purpose of having
those affections bestowed upon himself such an act itself dispenses with
the necessity of proving actual malice."' 3 It should be noted that in this
language the court had in mind the immediate facts of the present case in
which a stranger to the marital relationslp was the defendant. In some
actions for alienation of affections, such as those caused by the actions of
parents, it might well be argued that, unless the parents were actuated by
express malice, no punitive damages should be awarded for the reason that
the parents might have had the best of motives, however mistaken, in caus-
ing the alienation.
When a person has successfully defended a statutory replevin action and
there has been no interference with his possessory interest, may that person
recover for the unsuccessful plaintiff in the replevin action for: (1) money
expended by his attorney in travel, (2) stenographic fees in connection with
depositions, (3) attorney fees, (4) cost of a redelivery bond? Dollar Sav-
ings & Trust Co. v. Sydah Vending Co'14 held that such recovery was en-
1062 Ohio L Abs. 81, 106 N.2d 169 (Ohio App. 1951).
"Id. at 84, 106 N.E.2d at 171.
"157 Ohio St 454, 105 N.E.2d 868 (1952).
Id. at 462, 105 N.E.2d at 872.
1491 Ohio App. 289, 108 N.E.2d 113 (1951).
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